Triggers and damages of organizational defensive routines by Yang, Y. et al.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Triggers and damages of organizational defensive routines 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Existing research on organizational defensive routines (ODRs) posits that they have strong 
and intertwined individual and organizational components. However, the literature has not yet 
systematically isolated and analyzed factors at both levels that trigger ODRs.  This paper first 
utilizes theory on organizational routines to explain the characteristics of ODRs. Next, it 
identifies their individual and organizational level triggers. At the individual level factors 
generating ODRs are general self-efficacy, locus of control, and neuroticism while those 
operating at the organizational level are organizational politics, red tape, and organizational 
structure.  The paper finally explores the potential damages ODRs could cause to individuals 
and organizations related to individuals’ job satisfaction, work engagement, organizational 
ambidexterity, and organizational learning. The theoretical model in this paper builds a 
foundation for future empirical study and extends theoretically the nomological network of 
ODRs.  
  
2 
1. Introduction 
 
Early conceptualizations of routines being inert and stable have been recently challenged by 
studies which portray routines as generative systems which can enact new routines 
endogenously (e.g., Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Sonenshein, 2016; Yi, Knudsen, & Becker, 
2016). According to Feldman, Pentland, D’Adderio, & Lazaric's (2016) editorial in a Special 
Issue published in Organization Science, routine dynamics can connect inputs and outputs in 
organizations, but also act as sources of triggering change based on feedback, observation and 
communication.  This overthrows the conventional concept of routines being inert, mindless 
and automatic (Becker, 2004; Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Gersick & Hackman, 1990; Nelson 
& Winter, 1982).  The danger of over emphasizing the positive side of routines can possibly 
lead to a neglect of understanding the resistance to change in the routine.  
Researchers who study routine dynamics focus on identifying endogenous triggers to 
change in routines.  Talk is one trigger of routine change.  For example, after studying a start-
up company in the pharmaceutical industry, Dittrich, Guérard, & Seidl (2016) concluded that 
collective reflection through genuine talk enables organizations to find opportunities for 
routine change.  Lebaron, Christianson, Garrett, & Ilan (2016)’s study showed that 
exchanging experience among physicians at treating patients through routine meetings 
contributed to successfully handle issues based on contingency.  They did not consider the 
situation when individuals in organizations reluctantly  provide candid information to avoid 
embarrassment and threat resulting in keeping old routines.  Aroles & Mclean (2016)’s study 
indicated that managers ignored frontline workers’ valuable opinion and instead were 
insisting that employees would follow standard rules. Why did  managers not listen to the 
employees?  Why are the issues not discussed in detail?  One explanation is the existence of 
organizational defensive routines.  
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Organizational defensive routines (ODRs) are defined as “any actions and policies that 
organizations or segments used to avoid embarrassment and threat” (Argyris 1990, p.25).   
Such a defensive routine can work as a source of impeding change (Tranfield, Duberley, 
Smith, Musson, & Stokes, 2000), Employees often use covert behavior—one of the founding 
aspects of ODR—in the name of caring, diplomacy and appropriate conduct.  Nevertheless, 
the unintended consequences of defensive behavior have adverse effects on organizational 
values, goals and productivity (Sales, Vogt, Singer, & Cooper, 2013).  Argyris’ (1986) 
seminal work on defensive routines revealed how individuals’ good intention to avoid 
embarrassment results in a negative impact on organizational effectiveness.  He concluded 
that “by adeptly avoiding conflict with co-workers, some executives eventually wreak 
organizational havoc” (Argyris, 1986, p. 74).  ODRs are thought to be detrimental to 
organizational performance and a barrier to organizational learning (Argyris, 1990). They can 
damage organizations in the long term and cause disastrous results (e.g. Argyris, 1986; 
Holmer, 2013; Sales, Vogt, Singer, & Cooper, 2013).  
Despite the potential damages arising from ODRs, the literature lacks systematic 
understanding of their triggers and consequences.  Hence, this paper proposes a theoretical 
framework by using organizational routine theory to analyze the characteristics of ODRs, 
isolating antecedents and outcomes. The key research question is “What are the triggers and 
outcomes of organizational defensive routines?” 
This paper sets out to conceptualize the triggers of organizational defensive routines 
for individuals as general self-efficacy, locus of control and neuroticism. Furthermore, 
triggers at the organizational level are organizational politics, red tape, centralized 
organizational structure.  Finally, the paper also conceptualizes the potential impact 
(outcomes) of ODRs at the individual level as entailing job satisfaction and job engagement, 
as well as ambidexterity and learning at the organizational level.   
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With this paper, we make three contributions to the literature. First, we advance the 
literature on organizational routines by linking ODRs’ characteristics with current studies on 
organizational routines. This provides a novel perspective to understand the concept of 
individuals being agents of routines (Feldman and Pentland 2003).  Second, we extend the 
nomologic network of ODRs by theoretically deducting potential antecedents and outcomes.    
Third, the theoretical framework can be adopted by other researchers as a platform for future 
empirical studies.  
2. Organizational routines 
Theories on organizational routines can be divided into two aspects. The first aspect is 
dominated by traditional views of routines being a source of organizational inertia.  The 
rigidity of organizational routines can be easily understood by three famous analogies, 
namely, individual habit (e.g., Cohen, 2012; Gersick & Hackman, 1990), performance 
programs (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt et al., 1999) and biological genes (e.g., Nelson & 
Winter, 1982).  These three analogies portray routines as being automatic, mindless and 
effortless (e.g. Gersick & Hackman 1990; Becker, 2004; Makowski, 2017). This way of 
understanding routines often depict routines as a singular unit, ignoring the fact that different 
routines in organizations exist interdependently (Spee, Jarzabkowski, & Smets, 2016).  Also, 
the role of people who carry out these routines is overlooked by the conventional view 
(Feldman & Pentland, 2003).  
The second aspect of routines posits that routines are not only a source of stability, but 
also one of change. Yi, Knudsen, & Becker (2016) suggested that inertia in routines could 
engender organizational adaptation. The dynamism of routines is also apparent in a study of a 
newspaper factory where standardized routines can either cause problems or generate change 
in everyday practices (Aroles & Mclean, 2016).  This more current view provides the 
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theoretical foundation to understand how organizations with seemingly inert routines can 
survive the competition and adapt to a changing environment.   
However, organizations are composed by various interrelated routines which can be 
divided into enabling and defensive (Tranfield, Duberley, Smith, Musson, & Stokes, 2000). 
The process of modifying and updating routines as a positive correlate of change requires 
reducing the defensive ones.  In fact, a high level of resistance generated by routine-level 
inertia can block or slowdown organizational adaptation (Yi et al. 2016).  
Usually ODRs coexist with other routines, even though they are not explicitly labeled 
as ODRs, as it emerges from existing research.  For example, Gilbert (2005) suggested that 
leaders tend to increase standardization and reduce experimentation when they perceive 
themselves under a threatening situation.  Aroles and Mclean's (2016) interview study showed 
that individuals resort to suppress their opinions to avoid getting into troubles.  Bucher and 
Langley's (2016) study in a hospital showed that it took nurses four months to question the 
ambiguity of implementing new routines.  Hence, ODRs are closely associated with 
organizational inertia. 
2.1. Organizational defensive routines: Inertia  
ODRs are repetitive and recurrent behaviors which individuals use to avoid possible 
embarrassment and threat (Argyris, 1990).  Argyris clearly analyzed the aspect of ODRs 
being characterized by inertia through the lenses of a psycho-cognitive perspective. Among 
other factors, ODRs are composed by multiple individuals’ habitual behavior (Argyris, 1993).  
These habitual behaviors are governed by the same tacit rules: “1) Achieve your intended 
purpose, 2) maximize winning and minimize losing, 3) suppress negative feelings, 4) behave 
according to what you consider rational” (Argyris, 1993, p.52).  These governing rules guide 
individuals to apply ambiguous language to cover up their genuine opinions and avoid 
negative consequences. The receivers of ambiguous messages also avoid challenging the 
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inferences, hoping to prevent the senders from being embarrassed (Noonan, 2007). The 
strategies applied to avoid embarrassment and threat may include: (a) bypassing, that is 
overlooking problems and skipping to other tasks; (b) easing in, that is, for example, joining a 
process without asking challenging questions directly; (c) face-saving, where individuals 
master hiding strategies to mitigate threats or face losing; (d) mixed messages, the messages 
delivered by organizations are illogical, inconsistent and never up for discussion; (e) fancy 
footwork, that is work that looks professional and well-executed but is, in fact, imprecise, 
tentative and incompetent; (f) protective support, given to shelter employees or managers 
from experiencing the “real world;” and (g) self-censoring, in place every time strategies are 
utilized to suppress opinions which are potentially valuable for organizations, but are not 
preferred by some other employees in organizations (Argyris, 1990; Noonan, 2007; Wilson, 
2001). Considered together, these elements can be summarized as being the core of defensive 
routines (Wilson, 2001). Moreover, these strategies make “the undiscussable” undiscussable 
and reinforce defensiveness on behalf of  all the parties involved. It became an automated 
behavior which can be barriers at solving organizational issues efficiently and effectively 
(Makowski, 2016). Eventually, these routines become a big “elephant in the room” because 
people are afraid to talk about them.  Hence, changing defensive routines becomes a tricky 
issue many organizations face. 
This situation creates barriers for organizations to define the causes of embarrassment 
and make changes.  From a social cognition perspective, ODRs are the outcome of individual 
personal attributes and organizational context (Yang, Secchi, & Homberg, 2018).  
Individuals’ personal preferences on avoiding embarrassment and conflict can lead them to 
adopt ambiguous language to communicate with other people. When other people receive the 
information, they can sense the senders’ intention and respond consistently (Fiske & Taylor, 
2013).  According to social conventions in most workplaces, not openly confronting people’s 
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reasoning and concealing your own weaknesses is considered acceptable behavior (Argyris, 
1990).  Therefore, people believe that it is rational to shy away from potential risks due to 
their cognitive limits (Simon, 1979; Secchi, 2011) and social cognitive thinking. This 
defensive behavior is encouraged by an organizational context in which disagreement and 
dissent are often avoided.  
2.2. Organizational defensive routines and organizational adaptation 
If ODRs are self-reinforcing and as inert as previous research suggested, how can many 
organizations survive through change? In a study of organizational change, Yi et al. (2016) 
state that “[i]nertia in routines resists and slows down the implementation of planned changes 
to the routines, which generates divergence between choices (planning) and actions 
(implementation)” (p. 785).  Hence, according to them, inertia could be a source of change. 
The presence of ODRs hinders organizations from having radical learning, such as double-
loop learning (Argyris, 1990), which requires individuals to reflect on their assumptions and 
beliefs.  Learning requires individuals to identify and correct errors, which often is 
accompanied with challenging established routines.  Opportunities for new routines to emerge 
are created by frankly reflecting on current routines and talking about the alternative routines 
with other organizational members (e.g., Dittrich, Guérard, & Seidl, 2016; Feldman, 2000). 
The existence of ODRs makes it challenging to achieve an open discussion of ideas 
among employees though.  Hence, only small changes leading to single-loop learning (instead 
of the more powerful double-loop learning) are implemented. Single-loop learning only 
changes behavior, but does not change its underlying values and beliefs (Argyris 1990).  Such 
small changes can keep organizations alive for a while as they create a cosmetic solution to 
organizational issues and possibly contribute to organizational learning in the short term 
(Yang, Secchi, & Homberg, 2018).  Framed differently, ODRs can be defined by the 
differences between what individuals think and what they actually do (Argyris 1990).  If this 
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mismatch lasts long enough, individuals could feel dissatisfied with the working environment 
resulting in an impetus of radical change.  Leaders’ bounded rationality can either facilitate 
employees to conceal or reveal their genuine ideas (Yi et al. 2016).   
3. Triggers of organizational defensive routines  
Routine theories indicate that organizational routines are composed by two recursive aspects 
usually referred to as the ostensive and performative elements of routines (Feldman & 
Pentland, 2003).  Ostensive aspects are exemplifying “the routine in principle” (Feldman & 
Pentland, 2003, p. 101). They provide rough guidance for individuals’ actions, but ostensive 
aspects of routines only become apparent in performance (Feldman & Pentland, 2003).   The 
performative aspect of routines is understood as ‘routine in action’ in “specific time and 
places, by specific people” (Feldman & Pentland, 2003, p. 101). Hence, routines can be 
influenced by organizations through structured rules and principles, and these rules become 
alive through the action of individuals.  The so-called human capital and individuals’ abilities 
can influence the way of interpreting routines and interacting with other people (e.g., Felin, 
Foss, Heimeriks, & Madsen, 2012; Howard-Grenville, 2005).  This is also true for ODRs.  
Existing research focused on identifying different defensive strategies people used in 
organizations which characterize ODRs, such as mixed messages, bypass, easing, face-saving, 
fancy footwork, protective support, self-censoring and forthrightness (e.g., Argyris, 1990; 
Wilson, 2001). To better understand the mechanics of these routines, we have divided them 
according to their impact on individual and organizational levels, and isolated six elements 
that are likely to manifest together with and affect ODRs. Self-efficacy (Ashforth & Lee, 
1990), neuroticism (Yang et al. 2018), and locus of control (Judge et al. 1998) are three 
elements that, according to the literature, trigger defensive behavior in individuals. These 
have been selected because they have been directly tied to behavior, as discussed below. On 
the organizational side, red tape (Bozeman & Feeney, 2011), organizational politics (Rosen, 
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Harris, & Kacmar, 2009), and centralization (Damanpour, 1991) are considered since they 
have been traditionally related to some dysfunctional aspects of an organization’s life. These 
two levels are intertwined and we are splitting them analytically with the sole purpose of 
gaining a better framework for interpreting and diagnosing defensive routines.   
There are other factors outside organizations that could also trigger organizational 
defensive routines.  For example, an economic crisis provides the perfect ground to put 
organizations in a “fight mode,” and this could give rise to the defensive routines. This and 
similar other external factors have an impact on all organizations, and are out of their control. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that every organization reacts similarly. And this is 
where this paper comes in since it focuses on the factors for which we could deduce 
relationships between variables based on existing literature review and which can be managed 
by organizations. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the paper does not provide an 
exhaustive list of the triggers and outcomes of ODRs. It merely serves as a preliminary 
exploration for future studies of ODRs. The following section systematically discusses the 
triggers of ODRs at the individual and organizational levels.   
3.1. Individual level triggers 
The word “trigger” is here used to define elements and factors that makes it more likely for 
ODRs to develop, sustain themselves, and remain untouched. From a more canonical angle, 
we would have used the word “antecedents” however, we are not claiming a strict causality 
between the factors below and defensive routines. Given the core position routines occupy in 
an organization, they are influenced by most procedural, structural, and strategic aspects of 
organizational dynamics. For this reason, while we can claim that, according to the literature, 
some of the following elements facilitate the emergence and existence of defensive routines, it 
would be a stretch to indicate strict causality.  However, it should be clear that we are not 
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providing an exhaustive list of the triggers here, many other triggers and outcomes of ODRs 
could be identified in the future studies.   
General self-efficacy (GSE). GSE is defined as “individuals’ perception of their ability to 
perform across a variety of different situations” (Judge, Erez, & Bono, 1998, p.170).  GSE is 
trait-like and can be applied to capture individuals’ tendency at viewing themselves capable 
of performing successfully in various situations (Chen, Gully, Whiteman, & Kilcullen, 2000). 
Individuals “of low self-efficacy are easily convinced of the futility of effort when they come 
up against institutional impediments, whereas those of high GSE figure out ways to surmount 
them” (Bandura, 2012, p.14).  The belief of being able to make a difference in outcomes can 
motivate people with high GSE to voice their genuine opinions.   
In contrast, people with low GSE tend to experience anxiety when dealing with 
difficult situations, such as embarrassment and threat. Results from the literature on 
organizational silence suggest that individuals with low GSE often feel they have little to 
offer, so that they tend to hold back their thoughts (e.g., Detert & Burris, 2007; Morrison & 
Milliken, 2000).  Self-censorship and bypassing strategies could be used to protect themselves 
from experiencing negative emotions.  In their work on GSE, Ashforth and Lee (1990) also 
noted that newcomers with low self-efficacy tend to feel less confident to propose innovative 
ideas. Hence, low levels of GSE could trigger some of the elements we used above to describe 
ODRs. 
Neuroticism. Neurotic individuals tend to feel depressed, fearful and anxious toward novel 
situations (Judge et al., 1998).  Individuals with high neuroticism may find it challenging to 
cope with difficult situations, such as resolving conflicts and handling negative feedback. 
Studies show that neuroticism, in most cases, is negatively correlated with work performance 
(Judge et al., 1998) and participation in self-managed work groups (Thoms, Moore, & Scott, 
1996). High neurotic people tend to feel uncomfortable to interact with other people, and this 
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restricts their ability to share knowledge (Borges, 2013). Researchers also propose that 
neuroticism could positively correlate with employee silence due to their tendency of feeling 
insecure and embarrassed (Brinsfield, 2013). A recent study conducted on a sample of  N = 
351 British employees by Yang et al. (2018) showed that high neuroticism is positively 
associated with ODRs.  
Locus of control. Locus of control is an individual motivational trait and is source of 
psychological empowerment (De Hoogh & Den Hartog, 2009). Individuals with an external 
locus of control are likely to feel less empowered to influence working environment than 
individuals with an internal locus of control (Judge et al., 1998).  People high on external 
locus of control could feel it is meaningless to reveal their opinions and question the inference 
of decision making in organizations.  Due to their pessimistic view of their ability to control 
the environment, people high on external locus of control could resort to bypass the problems 
by following the majorities. As a result, they will contribute to trigger ODRs.  
3.2. Organizational level triggers  
As mentioned above, some of the elements reviewed below may work under the premises that 
some key individuals show high neuroticism traits, are less confident in their abilities to 
perform organizational work, and/or assume an external locus of control. These psychological 
mechanisms cannot be excluded from the picture when reviewing organizational level 
phenomena such as red tape, organizational politics and centralization. However, these three 
elements below can be (and are) typically framed at the organizational level because they 
exist independently of the particular employee or manager that enforces them here-and-now. 
As such, and being the result of the combined work of multiple actors, constraints, structural 
elements, and cultural aspects, the following are both affected by and affect individual 
thinking and behavior. 
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Red tape.  Red tape is conceptualized as “burdensome administrative rules and procedures 
that have negative effects on the organizations effectiveness” (Bozeman & Feeney, 2011, 
p.84).  Red tape is often based on individuals’ subjective perception and it is an outcome of 
individuals’ psychological interpretation of organizational social dynamics (Davis & Pink-
Harper, 2016).  If individuals perceive that organizations have cumbersome rules to go 
through for making changes, they may abandon their initiatives to avoid the amount of effort 
and time involved to go through the procedures. Argyris (1990) posits that managers in 
organizations create many policies to protect themselves and avoid being blamed. Hence, the 
existence of red tape could be a sign of ODRs.  
Organizational politics.  Organizational politics are commonly viewed as “behavior that is 
strategically designed to maximize short term or long-term self-interest” (Cropanzano, 
Howes, Grandey, & Toth, 1997, p.161). This type of behavior is perceived to be 
dysfunctional (Cropanzano et al. 1997). People working in an environment entrenched with 
politics often feel uncomfortable and emotionally drained, resulting in increased 
organizational withdrawal, such as turnover (Rosen, Harris, & Kacmar, 2009).  Additionally, 
political actors could hold important information to achieve personal interest.  In this working 
environment, people tend to protect their own personal interest instead of thinking at 
organizational benefits.  In order to protect their own interest, individuals could adopt some 
defensive behavior such as avoiding conflict, shining away from blames and self-censorship. 
Hence, we can infer that organizational politics can induce ODRs.  
Centralized organizational structure. By referring to organizational structure one defines the 
way organizations distribute power, resources, and responsibilities. It also indicates the roles 
individuals are expected to play (Walsh & Ungson, 1991).  Centralization is characterized by 
decision-making power being controlled by a small group of individuals, normally top 
managers (Damanpour, 1991). When organizations have a high centralized structure, a small 
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group of elites are expected to be decision makers and they are positioned at the top of a 
hierarchical pyramid. This way of structuring organizations creates barriers for information 
flow and innovation (Damanpour, 1991). A centralized structure tends to fail to involve 
employees in decision making processes and it creates a power distance between managers 
and employees. This distance could discourage employees from coming up with new ideas 
challenging the status quo as it is risky to question managers’ reasoning when inconsistent 
and irrational decisions when made. They may feel to put their job in jeopardy with speaking 
up.  Managers also become less approachable for discussing sensitive issues that could 
contribute to the creation of new routines.  As a result, centralization becomes a possible 
foundation for ODRs to grow and spread.  
4. Outcomes of ODRs 
The existing literature on ODRs mainly focuses on evaluating the negative outcome of ODRs 
on organizational learning through case studies (Argyris, 1990, 2001).  Though the latest 
empirical study conducted by Yang et al. (2018) sheds some light on understanding the 
possible positive outcomes of ODRs on organizational learning, these results are rather in 
contrast with the well-established belief that ODRs have negative effects. This study suggests 
that the view on defensive routines may not be as clear-cut as originally thought, but a more 
nuanced perspective is needed. This may provide a more balanced view of organizational 
dynamics where some level of dysfunction (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012) or disorder (Herath, 
Secchi, & Homberg, 2016; Herath, Costello, & Homberg, 2017) is actually necessary to 
successful management. On this respect, additional research is needed to find a more 
conclusive evidence on the subject. In fact, due to the lack of systematic studies on ODRs, 
theoretical reasoning on the outcome of ODRs is rather speculative. Future empirical studies 
would benefit from testing the relations between ODRs and other variables such as, for 
example, job satisfaction, affective commitment, and turnover. The following section 
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discusses the potential outcomes of ODRs on individuals in organizations and on the 
organization as a whole.  
4.1. Outcomes of ODRs on individuals 
Job satisfaction and engagement. ODRs could have an impact on many different aspects of 
employees’ attitudes towards their jobs. For example, one may consider job satisfaction, 
employee engagement, work motivation and organizational commitment among many others. 
These may, in turn, affect other factors such as performance and/or intentions to leave.  
However,  we selected job satisfaction and engagement due to four reasons. First, ODRs 
generate negative “energy” which would affect employees’ attitude toward their job role 
through the selected two outcome variables.  This is because ODRs create passive influence 
on individuals, especially through various strategies such as suppressing genuine feedbacks, 
avoiding conflict and applying ambiguous messages (Holmer, 2013; Sales, Vogt, Singer, & 
Cooper, 2013; Yang, Secchi, & Homberg, 2018).  Employees resort to ODRs to deal with 
embarrassment and threat when they are not true to their feelings (Argyris 1990). Negative 
emotions often result to reduce the positive energy of employees’ willingness to engage with 
their job (Rayton &Yalabik, 2014). Second, job satisfaction and engagement are often studied 
together in the literature (Rayton & Yalabik, 2014; Yalabik, Popaitoon, Chowne, & Rayton, 
2013) .  The third reason is that these two selected outcomes are extensively studied because 
of their importance and relevance to performance, employee well-being, turnover intentions 
and, ultimately, business long term success (e.g. Kim et al., 2017; Holland, Cooper, & 
Sheehan, 2017 and Ruck, Welch, Menara, 2016).  Finally, these two outcomes of ODRs 
directly relate to the type of work employees perform. Given their core position in 
organization and management research, it is particularly interesting to explore whether and 
how defensive routines affect them.  
15 
 Routines, and defensive routines in particular, have been linked to learning and 
cognitive aspects of individual and organizational life. There are apparent reasons to value 
that type of contribution and, at the same time, a line of research that is more tied towards 
traditional management constructs (such as satisfaction and engagement) has potentials to 
provide more value to the traditional focus of ODRs. We detail why in the following pages. 
Job satisfaction. Job satisfaction focuses on employees’ attitudes toward their job.  Aspects 
of job satisfaction have been extensively explored from different disciplines. Individuals in 
the workplace usually interact with other people, such as colleagues and managers and, 
depending on the role, customers, suppliers, government officials, and/or other stakeholders. 
Hence, their perception of the work environment will have an influence on their behavior and 
attitudes toward their job.  Research conducted by Meneghel, Borgogni, Miraglia, Salanova, 
and Martínez (2016), for example, found that a positive social context can improve 
individuals’ job satisfaction.  ODRs are collective behaviors which are triggered by 
individual’s assumption of situations when embarrassment and threat are more likely to occur 
(Argyris 1990). In order to avoid embarrassment, individuals often adopt ambiguous or 
defensive language to conceal their genuine feelings (Noonan, 2011).  In the short term, as 
everyone collectively applies the same routine to cope with sensitive issues, this can form a 
collective perception of the social context—organizations sacrifice effective decision making 
for playing safe and conflict avoidance. Collective perceptions of the social context positively 
relates to job satisfaction (Meneghel et al., 2016) hence, we can deduce that ODRs could 
create a harmonious working environment and lead to temporary increases in job satisfaction.  
 However, in the long term, the underlying issues resulting in organizational problems 
are swept under the carpet and become a barrier for job performance improvement.  A case 
shown by Argyris (1990, p.5) shows that employees conceal their knowledge on how to 
improve cost reductions in order to avoid conflict with managers. Gradually, this avoidance 
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behavior can diminish the trust in the organization because it is perceived unsafe to voice 
divergent opinions.  Suppressing voice is negatively related to job satisfaction (Knoll & van 
Dick, 2013).  Therefore, the relation between ODRs and job satisfaction could be inversely U-
shaped.  
Employee engagement. Engaged employees are able to “employ and express themselves 
physically, cognitively, and emotionally during role performances” (Kahn, 1990, p.694). 
Internal communication usually plays a crucial role in employee engagement.  Specifically, 
the way senior managers are responsive to employees’ voice can either encourage or 
discourage employee engagement (Ruck, Welch, & Menara, 2016).  Employees working in 
organizations with ODRs tend to experience defensive communication which is applied to 
hide the message senders’ inference (Argyris 1990).  The way of crafting defensive 
communication is often self-referenced, such as “that is the way it is”, “it has been always like 
this,” and “ trust me, I know it.”  Challenging this kind of communication could create an 
impression of being distrustful and incompetent.  Questioning the inference of ambiguous 
communication could put the senders and recipients of such messages under embarrassment 
or threat.  Consequently, people involved with ODRs have to suppress their genuine feelings 
toward issues in the  workplace.  This can demotivate employees in engaging their tasks and 
performing to their full potential in their job roles.  
According to social cognition theories, people learn what is an appropriate way to 
respond to issues by observing other people (Bandura, 2012; Kunda, 1999).  Defensive 
routines make people dislocate themselves physically from identifying the root causes of 
problems.  Emotionally, people learn to self-protect themselves for their own interest instead 
of organizational goals. Hence, ODRs can decrease engagement.  
Another consideration that supports the arguments above relates to the characteristics 
of the employee or manager under analysis. An employee characterized by significant levels 
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of neuroticism, low self-efficacy, and external locus of control may also show low 
engagement and low job satisfaction (e.g., Judge & Bono, 2001;Kim, Shin, & Swanger, 
2009). The role of ODRs may be considered, in this case, a vehicle that brings these 
individual characteristics to the surface. In other words, it is likely that ODRs work as 
mediators for all three individual level factors discussed. We maintain that there may be a 
direct effect of these three on engagement and satisfaction but that ODRs is one of the 
vehicles through which these characteristics materialize on more organization-focused 
outcome variables. 
4.2. Influence of ODRs on organizations  
There are various aspects of organizational life that may be affected by routines in general 
and ODRs in particular, such as organizational performance, innovation and competitiveness. 
However, due to space limitation and focus, we concentrate on these two variables which 
literature shows to be some of the most relevant for ODRs.  Learning is very much in line 
with the literature and is an obvious choice because of the way defensive mechanisms hinder 
cognitive processes (see below). In contrast, the link between ODRs and ambidexterity is a 
connection that we propose in this paper for the first time. Ambidexterity increasingly gains 
researchers’ attention in management theory, as it has proven to be key to dynamism, 
adaptability, and sound performance, given turbulent environmental conditions (Meglio, 
King, & Risberg, 2015). In this respect, mechanisms that block innovation and adaptability 
such as defensive routines may be particularly harmful to this important element of current 
successful organizations. In the following, we specify how this connection works. 
Organizational Ambidexterity. Ambidexterity is a key to organizational success and job 
performance (Gibson, Birkinshaw, Gibson, & Birkinshaw, 2004). Ambidextrous 
organizations have abilities to engage in dual aspects of organizational growth by exploiting 
the existing competencies, while simultaneously, exploring innovativeness to meet the 
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challenges in the current and future market requirement (Patel, Messersmith, & Lepar, 2013).  
In order to be ambidextrous, organizations need to develop a context that embraces open, 
candid, and rapid feedback. This encourages employees to have more ambiguous objectives, 
it maintains stable managerial support, and establishes trust (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004).  
However, such conditions stand in extreme contrast to ODRs. The nature of ODRs is to use 
mixed messages to protect themselves from potential negative consequences, hence, a mode 
of communication that people adopt and that is mainly opaque and inconsistent (Argyris, 
1990).  Without genuine feedback and clear guidance, employees most likely do not have a 
focused vision and/or ambitious objectives for their job. This may decrease the chances that 
the organization develops some ambidexterity.  On the one hand, mixed messages and covert 
communication contribute to set ambiguous objectives and this is, at least partially, in line 
with ambidexterity. On the other hand, however, ambiguity created via ODRs does not 
contribute to transparency or openness, and it does not work as a trust enabler. For this 
reason, ambiguity through ODRs is not perceived as a way to open further opportunities but 
as a blocking mechanism instead. 
Additionally, employees working in organizations with ODRs tend to assume some 
issues to be undiscussable.  This impedes employees from self-reflection on their own 
contribution to generating ODRs and prevents organizations from learning about the causes of 
these issues. For example, Sales, Vogt, Singer and Cooper’s (2013) research on ODRs in a 
hospital pointed out that healthcare practitioners assume that errors in their practice are not 
acceptable, so these practitioners tend to conceal the errors and avoid blames.  Consequently, 
the hospital lost chances to explore the possibilities of improving patients’ safety. 
Furthermore, ODRs are known to prevent individuals from engaging in deep reflections and 
analyses of organizational issues. Instead, they only make incremental changes at a superficial 
level, by exploiting current resources.  Lack of collective reflective talking could impede the 
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emergence of new routines (Dittrich et al., 2016) and restrict organizations at developing 
adaptability for future challenges.  After considering all these aspects, it can be concluded that 
ODRs could be negatively related to organizational ambidexterity.  Specifically, ODRs could 
induce individuals to play safe by aligning their performance with established formal 
processes rather than taking risks to explore new practices.  
Organizational learning. As already mentioned above, the negative impact of ODRs on 
organizational learning is not new and it has been extensively investigated (e.g., Argyris, 
2001).  Surprisingly, this well-established understanding of ODRs and organizational learning 
has been challenged by recent studies (Yang et al., 2018).  Therefore, there is a need to further 
clarify this relation and provide a solid ground for future research intended to replicate the 
study empirically.  
 Argyris (1990) explicitly defined organizational learning as identifying errors and 
correcting errors. Building on this definition, he clearly divided organizational learning into 
single-loop and double-loop learning.  Most of Argyris’ work (1990, 1993, 2002) endeavored 
to explain the relation between ODRs and double-loop learning. This is reflected in the 
assertion that people’s tendency to avoid embarrassment and threat only leads to cosmetic 
solutions to organizational issues and single-loop learning.  Hence, the claim at ‘ODRs are 
anti-learning’ needs to be more specifically narrowed down to double-loop learning.  The 
current state of continuously changing markets requires double-loop learning since the 
generation of radical changes is important for organizations to survive and prosper, given the 
fierce competition (Lipshitz, 2000).  However, it is of pivotal importance to make sure that 
available resources and skills create financial sustainability and reduce costs.  Based on this 
reasoning, the relation between ODRs and organizational learning is inversely U-shaped.  
Empirical studies on testing this relation need to clearly measure both types of organizational 
learning to segregate the effect between variables.  
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 Figure 1 summarizes the system of triggers and outcomes as explained above. On the 
left hand side of the diagram, triggers are split in individual and organizational triggers. Some 
of these are intertwined and related by a double-arrowed line to indicate that it is possible 
that, for example, organizational politics and red tape are enforced especially by neurotic 
individuals with low general self-efficacy and external locus of control. At the same time, an 
environment characterized by politics and red tape may work as a disabler of self-efficacy and 
exploit more externally-driven individuals. These constructs affect ODRs and have been 
considered as triggers in our reasoning above. On the left hand side of the diagram, outcomes 
are represented. These are such that ODRs have a direct impact on them but, at the same time, 
there are direct links between some of the triggers and the outcomes. This is because, for 
example, red tape and a centralized formal structure may hinder ambidexterity and make the 
more dynamic aspects of learning more difficult. At the same time, as already noted above, 
the individual characteristics indicated in this theoretical framework may affect satisfaction 
and engagement directly as well as via defensive routines. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 One aspect of Figure 1 that is left ambiguous is the fact that individual and 
organizational triggers load on ODRs and these, in turn, then affect the outcomes. However, 
from this Figure 1, it remains unclear whether the individual triggers may affect 
organizational outcomes through ODRs. We have not argued one way or the other in the 
pages above but we have noted, at times, that there is broad interconnection between 
individual and organizational elements as far as defensive routines (and routines in general) 
are concerned. This leads to the claim that individual triggers may affect organizational 
outcomes only indirectly, that is via ODRs. The other cross-path—i.e. from organizational 
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triggers to individual outcomes—is also possible although the supporting literature is more 
limited in that respect. 
5. Conclusion  
The pervasiveness of ODRs in organizations is well-acknowledged by academics and 
practitioners. The emerging research on routine dynamics strives to decode the process of 
how new routines evolve.  Considering the omnipresence of ODRs and their position within 
the wider context of the theory of routines, it is important for researchers to systematically 
explore ODRs and extend their current knowledge and understanding.  It is also necessary to 
build on the literature of routine dynamics by understanding the reasons why some new 
routines take long time to have a breakthrough.  Read from the lenses of ODRs, defensive 
routines show the interdependence of multiple routines existing in the same organizations 
such that one kind of routine can become an obstacle to the change, implementation, and 
development of other routines.  The conceptual model presented in this paper is to be 
considered a stepping stone for future empirical studies.  
The model focuses on collective defensive behavior in organizations characterized as 
mostly inert and resistant to change. These routines operate in many different forms such as 
fancy footwork, protective support, self-censoring and mixed messages (Argyris, 1990; 
Wilson, 2001), but they share the same pattern of bypassing and covering up embarrassment 
and threats.  In this paper we have analyzed the triggers of ODRs by individual and 
organizational factors (see Figure 1).  Also, the paper conceptually derived some of the 
potential outcomes of defensive routines.  The discussion of ODRs’ influence on individuals 
and organizations shows that, to a certain extent, ODRs might generate short-term gains, but 
that they gradually become pathological to individuals’ attitude toward their job and 
organizations’ adaptability.  
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 The arguments in this paper provide some guidance for future studies. First, in order 
to systematically understand the mechanisms of ODRs, there is a need for researchers to 
empirically test and retest the newly developed scale developed by Yang, Secchi and 
Homberg (2017). It will also potentially facilitate the development of our understanding of 
ODRs by testing the relations as presented in this paper.  
 Future studies may also widen nomological networks of ODRs.  The paper provides a 
brief review of the triggers and outcomes. ODRs could also be triggered by some other 
variables such as organizational culture, motivation systems and technologies.  The outcome 
of ODRs could also be organizational performance, competitiveness, retention at 
organizational level.  More theoretical and empirical research is much needed in order to 
attest the actual effect of ODRs on other organizational factors.   
 Finally, research should integrate ODRs with the theory of organizational routines, 
especially with the latest track of routine dynamics.  For example, one may want to ask what 
roles do ODRs play in the emergence of new routines, or what cognitive perspective may be 
embraced to better understand the hidden nature of defensive routines.  
 Given the volatile of economic environment companies in the West are facing and the 
amount of changes many organizations need conduct to respond to unexpected international 
developments, it is important for researchers to understand ODRs systematically and provide 
suggestions for managers in practice to eliminate ODRs at their early stage of development.  
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Note: The solid lines signify direct relations that are the main focus of this 
paper. Dotted lines indicate a possible relation that usually appears in the literature. The double-arrowed line 
indicates a possible multi-level influence. 
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